Time, we are hearing with increasing frequency, is running out for the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is often attributed to the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but whatever the reason, few serious observers disagree that the two-state solution may be a practical impossibility within the days of the Obama era.

In fact, though the concern is correct, the perceived reason isn’t. Settlements can be abandoned or dismantled, roads can be opened to all and walls and barriers can be removed. The most difficult ones to eliminate will not be the new ones, but established ones like Kiryat Arba, and Hebron. Hussein Ibish, Senior Policy Fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP), correctly diagnoses the real threat in his new book, What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda:

“The moment at which a state of ‘impossibility’ for the realization of a two-state agreement is reached is…not the function of a critical mass…of changes constructed by Israel in the occupied territories…it is that moment when a critical mass of Israelis and Palestinians conclude that such a peace agreement is no longer feasible or desirable.”

The question then arises: what is the alternative?

It is in part because of the potential for this question to rise as well as the growing support for a one-state solution on campuses and on the Left that Ibish has written this book.

Right now, in all the circles that matter — Palestinian, Arab, Israeli and American —  the two-state solution is the only one even close to the table. But the one-state agenda will surely gain a good deal of traction if the two-state model fails, and Ibish launches a pre-emptive strike against this.

In fact, beyond what Ibish deals with in his book, there are three major one-state models:

• The Greater Israel vision, which, at minimum, would have Israel in full control of all of Mandatory Palestine and a lot fewer Arabs within those borders.
• The Islamist vision of a Muslim state in all of Mandatory Palestine, with a Jewish minority much smaller than the current population
• The secular-democratic single state, where all of the current inhabitants, plus returning Palestinian refugees, would be one political body

It is worth noting that the former two visions, which had both once been generally discredited, are gaining more adherents as the conflict continues and hatred on both sides mounts. Still, they are the province of radicals, often religious, always on the extreme fringe of nationalist passion.

The third, however, has a clear visceral appeal to democratic values. After all, one person one vote is a clear Western and democratic value, as is equality under the law. It is precisely this appealing yet insidious aspect of the one-state formulation that makes Ibish’s case so timely.

Ibish deconstructs the one-state argument with a fair degree of accuracy, laying out the reasoning used by its proponents clearly. It is based, first and foremost, on the perceived lack of viability of the two-state solution, particularly when it comes to the return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel proper.

The refugee issue is, of course, quite vexing as it is a deeply held Palestinian value and an absolute red line for all but a handful of the most anti-Zionist Israelis. One state seems to neatly resolve this tension.

But the extensive problems with the one state formulation are laid out with a clarity and incisiveness that only someone with Ibish’s deeply held belief in a two-state solution coupled with his extensive experience and contact with the one staters’ leading spokespeople could muster.

Ibish recognizes that Palestinians can never achieve freedom and self-determination without agreement from Israel, something the one-state adherents seem not to understand. He also recognizes not only the reality of superior Israeli power but he also respects the national will of the Israeli Jewish population. For this, naturally, he is regarded by one-staters as a “Zionist stooge.”

But Ibish’s argument is, at all times, firmly grounded in the best interests of the Palestinian people. He recognizes that the only sustainable solution is one that works, even if imperfectly, for both Jews and Arabs in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

Is this not precisely what so many naysayers have been decrying the lack of? When Jewish advocates of peace in Washington – J Street, Americans for Peace Now, Israel Policy Forum, B’Tselem’s DC Office – are asked where their Arab counterpart is, the Arabs that understand and respect Israel’s position and strive to truly address the needs of both sides equally, it is ATFP and people like Ibish they point to.

Ibish effectively demonstrates that the one-state agenda is unrealistic, unattainable and a threat to the Palestinian political agenda. He recognizes from the outset that a plan that offers nothing to Israeli Jews is neither a practical plan for Palestinians nor a morally justifiable notion for anyone. And he doesn’t hesitate to point out that in this regard, it is very similar to the status quo, which he sees as equally problematic in both practical and moral terms.

One piece that Ibish only implicitly touches on in his description of the one-state agenda is the belief which underlies the thinking of many (though not necessarily all) one-state advocates that the conflict can never be ultimately resolved as long as Zionism remains a driving ideology in Israel.

That Ibish doesn’t deal with this issue is not surprising as his focus is on the one-state thinking among Arab advocates. In the hardcore left, and amongst anti-Zionist Jews, however, the idea that Zionism is ultimately the problem is much more prominent.

To be sure, the entire conflict could be resolved much more easily if ideology was not such a huge factor. That’s true about Palestinian as well as Jewish nationalism. But it is. And the fact that one-staters tend to focus on only one side’s nationalism also reveals a larger portion of their view of the conflict.

Ultimately, any resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict has to include accommodations that satisfy the minimal needs of both sides. That necessarily also means serious compromises on both sides. Everyone knows this. Solutions and approaches that only address the “other side” out of grudging necessity are doomed to failure.

Citing Zionism as the primary issue is no better than the right-wing mantra that “if only the Palestinians would stop struggling, the conflict would be over.” This is and has always been a conflict of two deeply held nationalisms whose goals are ultimately mutually exclusive. Analyses that begin with the legitimacy of one of those nationalisms and the illegitimacy of the other lead to impractical solutions that will never be accepted by any party to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

But the one-state argument, as Ibish rightly points out, actually addresses the needs of neither side. That it necessarily involves the dissolution of the Jewish state is obvious, but it also means the Palestinians, at least in the short term, would have to abandon their own national aspirations. In any case, the goal is completely unattainable. Israelis will not give up the Jewish nature of the state. Any such plan necessarily involves widening and extending the conflict until Israel is defeated. It’s a terrible future to imagine, and it removes any reasonable hope from the Palestinians as well.

What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda makes a pro-Palestinian case for a two-state solution, and it makes a pro-Israeli one as well. That it comes from one of America’s most prominent Arab intellectuals makes it all the more significant. Like Ibish, I have had extensive and direct personal and professional contact with most of the leading one-state proponents in the US. If any of them have answers to his arguments, I have yet to see them.

Ultimately, one hopes that well-reasoned arguments like Ibish can remove or at least blunt the one-state distraction and bring that energy to a more constructive use. That’s needed, because the hope and faith in the two-state solution on the ground in both Israel and the Palestinian Territories is dwindling. As Ibish says, it’s not really a choice between one or two states. It’s a choice between the hope for peace and war continuing on into the foreseeable future.

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This industry is led by groups like NGO Monitor and UN Watch, and, while their role is certainly needed and acceptable, their tactics often fall well short of civilized political discourse.

There is nothing wrong with “watching the watchers.” It is not only fair but necessary for the work of human rights groups – whether international ones like Amnesty or Human Rights Watch, or domestic Israeli groups like B’Tselem, Breaking the Silence or Gisha – to be scrutinized closely. But there’s a difference between scrutiny and pursuing an agenda to delegitimize all criticism of Israel.

NGO Monitor is headed by Gerald Steinberg, the chair of the Political Science Department at Bar-Ilan University. The group spends its time examining all criticism of Israel, mostly from human rights groups both in Israel and abroad. They trace the funding and rely on a blanket label of “anti-Israel” to describe both the activities of Israeli and international NGOs as well as such funders as the New Israel Fund, European Union charitable funds, Oxfam, the Canadian International Development Agency, and USAID.

NGO Monitor says that by funding such groups as B’Tselem, Breaking the Silence, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, these governments and foundations “…contribute to conflict, and in some cases to incitement.” They also use innuendo, such as listing a host of groups “some of which support boycotts, divestment and sanctions” while intentionally including groups who do not support such measures.

This sort of chicanery is meant to not only shield Israel from unfair criticism, which is a laudable goal, but also to discredit legitimate criticism of Israeli policies and actions, which is not. But in fairness, they couldn’t do that if they weren’t getting a lot of help from human rights and other groups.

Israel is in fact unfairly singled out, for example, at the UN Human Rights Council, as the only country in the world under permanent review. Israel’s very real human rights violations are often used cynically for political gain, much as Israel’s own complaints about Arab human rights violations are.

Additionally, Israel has its own very well developed human rights community, part of a larger and vibrant Israeli civil society. Israel’s human rights violations are thus held up to scrutiny more than other countries. The US frequently contends with the same issue. Still, if the violations weren’t so severe, Israel would not have so much to worry about.

NGO Monitor turns this stunning example of the reality of Israeli democracy into a smear against those Israelis who try to hold Israel to the standards of its own high ideals. By asking why such groups as B’Tselem, Gisha, Yesh Din, Breaking the Silence and others do not raise issues of intra-Palestinian violations (which some of them do, often), they are intentionally framing these Israeli groups as having an innately Palestinian agenda.

In fact, those groups, as well as Israeli peace groups like Shalom Achshav or Gush Shalom, are distinctly Israeli, and act as the critics any democracy needs to function properly. Naturally, being Israeli groups, they focus much more strongly on Israeli human rights violations because their task is to improve Israeli society and policies.

Consider, for example, NGO Monitor’s criticism of B’Tselem: B’Tselem categorizes suicide bombings and rocket attacks targeting Israeli civilians as "war crimes" and "a grave breach of the right to life", according to international humanitarian law. Yet its political agenda is evident in the minimal attention it gives to intra-Palestinian human rights abuses (including torture, extra-judicial executions and abductions).

One need only look at B’Tselem’s web site to see it is a leader among non-Palestinian groups in criticizing intra-Palestinian abuses (see: http://www.btselem.org/English/Inter_Palestinian_Violations/), some even argue they are more so than an Israeli group should be. But indeed, B’Tselem focuses much more on Israeli violations and this does shed light on B’Tselem’s “agenda”: it is, primarily concerned about the actions of its own country, of strengthening the democracy it is part of. Its reason for existing is not primarily the good of the Palestinians—that is for Palestinians to pursue. It is for the good of Israel, because no democracy can sustain itself while turning a blind eye to its own behavior.

A major feature of NGO Monitor’s work is tying their criticisms (which are, to be fair, themselves a mix of distortions with a few legitimate complaints) to the network of governments and foundations that fund NGOs. This has come to the fore in recent weeks with the group Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the Silence).

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has asked the Dutch government to review their funding of Shovrim Shtika in the wake of the group publishing testimonies of soldiers who fought in Gaza earlier this year and reported human rights abuses. He has also publicly blasted the group.

Operation Cast Lead as a whole has been a storm for Israel to weather, and one that is unlikely to end soon. Israel’s refusal to launch a credible, independent investigation of the accusations that have been made about its conduct in Gaza, or to cooperate with any outside investigations, makes it impossible to get past the issue and ensures it will continue to be raised.

So instead, try to attack the funding.

Israeli NGOs are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. Funding for Israeli groups comes in very great measure from outside the country. That’s true for all Israeli groups, right to left, across the political and ideological spectrum. Israel lacks the sort of vast philanthropic network that, for instance, the United States has. Nor does the government allot significant sums for non-profits as one finds in Europe. In the US, lower taxes and tax breaks sustain a culture of philanthropy, while in Europe, higher taxes means the governments take more care of charitable giving. In Israel, though, the higher taxes pay instead for a massive defense budget.

So, just as foundations and other community sources in the US are the primary source for many right-wing groups in Israel, so too are international foundations the source of human rights and left-wing groups’ funding.

This isn’t foreign interference in Israeli affairs, it is the system of non-profit operations Israel has set up. And the attack on only one side of this system is unfair. NGO Monitor and similar groups should indeed be there to “watch the watchers,” but not to defend the Israeli government in any and all cases. Such groups should be there as part of the democratic system, and they should be there to ensure that human rights and peace groups’ work is of the highest standards, as those groups do with the government.

Until they stop pursuing an ideological agenda, the “watchers” are not doing their jobs.

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Here are a few facts. 

First of all, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the population growth in the settlements is 5.6% annually. That is three-and-a-half times the rate of Jewish population growth in Israel. Forty percent of settler population growth is directly attributable to immigration, with a significant part of the rest due to the increased childbirths as a result of that immigration.

Second, there is no housing crisis in the settlements. There remain many vacant units. The idea that "natural growth" forces families to separate is simply counter-factual. Creating more opportunities and incentives for settlers to move back to Israel proper would be a welcome development, but barring “natural growth” contributes little, if anything, in this regard. It simply stops the settlements from expanding.

Third, the idea that a young couple or an expanding family should somehow have the right, guaranteed by the government, to live in the place of their choosing, irrespective of the housing market, is absurd. No one in New York, London, Paris, or anywhere else has such a guarantee, nor do people in Tel Aviv, Haifa or Beersheva. Young settler couples, like any others, must hunt for housing in the existing housing market, and sometimes that means they have to move to a nearby town.

Fourth, the implication that families will be “separated” if some members need to move back to Israel is ridiculous, as anyone who has ever travelled in Israel knows. Israel is a small country. If someone needs to move and finds a nice, affordable place in Israel, they are a short drive or bus ride away from their former community.

Fifth, the municipal boundaries of the established settlements are three times the size of the built-up areas. Therefore, allowing ‘natural growth” exceptions has enormous potential for major settlement expansion.

Sixth, the argument that Israel cannot legally halt construction once tenders have been issued, apartments sold, and work begun, is absolutely false. In 1992, when settlers sued the Rabin government over their decision to freeze work already begun, the High Court of Justice ruled that even after work has begun, the government can stop work due to its policy decisions. If losses are thereby incurred, they would be settled in civil court. Two different decisions agreed on this point, and there is no contradictory precedent in Israeli jurisprudence.

That adds up to the seventh and overriding fact: there is no reason or rationale for making any exception, including “natural growth,” to a settlement freeze. It certainly doesn’t serve Israel’s interests; the settlements are a terrible strain on Israel’s budget, with housing subsidies, increased security, and the need for new infrastructure to supply electricity, roads, water and other services to comparatively remote locales. That is a cost the budget, with education, health and other social services being strangled, cannot withstand.

Under these circumstances, it is astounding that the Minister of Internal Affairs Eli Yishai (Shas) is threatening to grab every shekel he can and pour them into the settlements while Israel’s social services die a slow death. The only reason to oppose a settlement freeze is to oppose ending the occupation of the West Bank. It is to oppose any move toward peace. Sadly, for some like both Yishai and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that is apparently far more important than the well-being of Israelis behind the Green Line.

After the Freeze

Whether he ever admits it publicly or not, Netanyahu is overwhelmingly likely to implement the settlement freeze the US is demanding. The real question is: what then?

A settlement freeze accomplishes two things: one, it buys some time for the Palestinian Authority and for a real, tangible peace process to be revived. But only a few months. In those months, it will be crucial that genuine progress is made on the diplomatic front, on the ground in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and in terms of Israeli security.

The second thing it does is to bring the confrontation with the hardcore minority of the settler movement closer to the surface. A frequent refrain of late has been that Israel is “a country of laws.” Unfortunately, this has generally not been the case when it comes to enforcing the law on the settlers. That will have to change, and the most radical settlers’ likely response to a full and genuine freeze on all construction in the West Bank will put law and order to its final test. Either Israel gets serious about applying Israeli law to the settlers or it will demonstrate that it is not a country of law.

But that’s the limit of a freeze’s effects. Some, including such notable figures in Washington as Daniel Levy and Amjad Atallah of the New America Foundation, have argued that a freeze is the wrong goal, and that the enormous political capital a freeze demands from the US would be better spent on pushing for dismantlement of settlements. They fear that once a freeze is obtained, that political capital will be depleted.

I see it differently. I believe that a freeze will be an investment of political capital, one which will generate great returns if successful and open up more opportunities, including opportunities to push for a rollback of the settlement project. It will give the Palestinian Authority the first evidence it has had that, in the age of Obama, their approach works and Hamas’ does not. The continuing ability of the Palestinian Authority’s forces to keep a lid on terrorist activity in the West Bank, coupled with a settlement freeze, will create hope and support for next steps.

But Levy and Atallah are certainly correct that a freeze does nothing in the long run by itself. It must be followed quickly by serious steps toward a final resolution of this conflict. It will open the opportunity for such an outcome.

Benefits of a Settlement Freeze

A freeze will restore some credibility to the PA. If it is successful and Israelis see no decline in security, it will legitimize Obama’s approach and further discredit Netanyahu’s intransigence, particularly in the eyes of the Israeli public.

The ball will then be in Obama’s court, and the next step will be even more difficult. In order to capitalize on the freeze, he will have to get concessions from both Israel and the Arab world. He will have to continue to press Netanyahu to continue with the removal of roadblocks in the West Bank, to dismantle the “illegal outposts,” keep a moratorium on house demolitions in East Jerusalem and to find some way to allow reconstruction materials into Gaza without strengthening Hamas.

The danger is that if Israel is seen to be making all the concessions and getting nothing immediate in return, Obama will start to lose the unprecedented support he has right now from Congress and the pro-Israel community. The Palestinians will need to maintain and even strengthen their security apparatus and prove that they can maintain control in the West Bank.

But much more will be needed. Obama will have to get the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, to begin to melt the ice between themselves and Israel. Nothing like full diplomatic relations, of course, which must wait until a Palestinian state emerges. But something is needed — some kind of trade relations or an easing of the boycott of Israeli products.

It can’t all wait until the occupation completely ends. Obama has already begun pushing for some steps from the Arab world, and it will be crucial that he convince the Arab states to take them. One of the main problems with bilateralism is that the Palestinians have nothing to offer Israel that is tangible. The Arab states do, and Obama must obtain something to show Israel that peace is paying off for them as well.

That’s really the dance the President has to do now. When he gets the freeze (and I have no doubt he will get it if he sticks to his guns), he then needs to make sure it means something in the long term for the Palestinians and that it pays off for Israel as well. Not easy, but certainly possible. Obama has acted forcefully and boldly on this issue much earlier than most thought he would. He has earned some faith that he can take the more complicated steps before him. He’d better; because time is running short for a two-state solution and the obstacles in the region are perhaps as big as they’ve ever been.

The post Unnatural Growth appeared first on Jewcy.

In 2007, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt brought all the theorizing and debating over the role of the “Israel Lobby” in US policy to the forefront. For many, their theory seemed to have too many holes. Those who approached the work of the two esteemed international relations professors critically but rationally pointed us toward the need of a much better understanding of the Lobby and what its effects and limits were.

The confluence of that ongoing debate and the recent direction of US policy illustrates the need for a book like Dan Fleshler’s Transforming America’s Israel Lobby: The Limits of Its Power and the Potential for Change.

This is a book that should have been written many years ago. It is full of insight into the major Jewish organizations, as well as some non-Jewish ones, working on the issue of Israel. It’s also constructive, offering practical guidance as to how those of us whose passion for peace and desire for fair treatment of Palestinians is equal to our concern for Israel’s well-being might begin to blaze a new policy trail.

Fleshler dispassionately analyzes the depth and limits of the power held by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the major lobbying force protecting the status quo in US policy. Unlike Walt and Mearsheimer, who depict AIPAC as the spearhead of a virtually indomitable bastion of power, Fleshler, operating with a great deal of direct knowledge enhanced by discussions with those of us who work in the field, reveals the mix of real influence and mythology that gives AIPAC the influence it wields.

There’s a curious effect of anti-Semitism that paradoxically helps enhance the influence of the major Jewish organizations in Washington. Fleshler reminds us of Chaim Weizmann’s ability to convince British leaders that the Jewish community, thoroughly powerless at the time, could bring valuable support in exchange for British endorsement of Zionism. Weizmann capitalized on anti-Semitic myths about Jewish power and secret control. In some ways, AIPAC does the same, though I’m sure they don’t think of what Fleshler calls “power puffery” in those terms.

That is not to say that the organized Jewish community doesn’t wield considerable political power in the US. Fleshler does a masterful job of portraying the actual political influence that AIPAC and other groups wield, without either overblowing or underplaying it.

It is precisely this contextualizing of AIPAC that marks this book a success in all the ways that Walt and Mearsheimer fell short. The two professors, whose expertise does not lie in a Washington scene with which they have only a dilettante’s familiarity, can’t match Fleshler’s insight into the workings of Washington, much less the Jewish community.

Trying to analyze not only AIPAC, but also the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the Conference of Presidents, as well as the other side of the coin — Israel Policy Forum, J Street, and Americans for Peace Now — without any understanding of the community from which they spring is impossible. Walt, Mearsheimer, and most of the writers and bloggers who pontificate about The Lobby make this very mistake.

But it’s a community Fleshler has not only spent his whole life in, but has played a variety of key roles in. He is thus able to round out his analysis with an insider’s knowledge of the framework and a familiarity with the people he needed to interview for this book.

The particular strength of Transforming America’s Israel Lobby is that, despite his oft-stated and clear allegiance to the “pro-Israel, pro-peace” camp Fleshler largely speaks with familiarity and objectivity about the so-called “Israel Lobby groups” like AIPAC, the AJC, and the Conference of Presidents. As a result, the reader will get the insight into the mainstream Jewish community they need to understand how these institutions achieved their stature and why they pursue the policies they do.

Fleshler reserves his harsher words for extremists on both right and left. And yet, even here, his view is nuanced. When discussing one group, Jewish Voice for Peace, which straddles a line between the far left and Fleshler’s own chevra, he notes his frequent disagreements with them, but bemoans the fact that they and the groups he favors have not been able to find a way to work at some level with each other. Indeed, he’s correct—this is a serious weakness on the left, one the right experiences to a much lesser degree.

Fleshler also draws a clear line between the far right politically active groups like the Zionist Organization of America, more center-right groups like AIPAC and centrist groups like the AJC. Almost all discussions of “The Lobby” acknowledge that there is a variety of groups involved, but fail to actually distinguish between them. The differences are actually quite important.

Fleshler is driving at an alternative lobby to create significant political pressure for the course favored by most Americans, including both Jewish and Arab Americans. Polls have consistently shown that most American Jews support increased US engagement in diplomacy and pressure on both Israel and Palestinians if necessary. Yet the leadership of Jewish organizations do not reflect the views of their own constituents and members of Congress believe that Abe Foxman, David Harris, Howard Kohr and Malcolm Hoenlein represent the views of mainstream Jews. They don’t, according to virtually every poll published.

The reason for the misperception is that the segment of the Jewish community (and this is actually true of the larger American public as well) that they do represent is far more committed and active on the issue. Most who support an American policy closer to the one Obama has seemingly embarked on simply have other concerns that are higher priorities.

The “pro-Israel, pro-peace” camp needs to find a way to galvanize those people and to make Middle East peace a higher priority for them. Fleshler does a very good job of laying out both why this is so crucial and what most of the obstacles are.

And here is where I have my one nitpick with Fleshler’s book.  In his reading of the evolution of the politics of Israel in the US, he misses what I consider to be one of that history’s major turning points: Ehud Barak’s message that there is no “partner for peace” on the Palestinian side.

Fleshler does discuss the failure of the talks at Camp David in 2000. But he omits any exploration of the impact that Barak’s and Bill Clinton’s decision to lay all the blame on Yasir Arafat for that failure. It largely destroyed the peace camp in Israel and seriously impacted it here as well, despite the fact that Barak’s picture of Camp David is wildly inaccurate (see Martin Indyk’s comments here. Bill Clinton also later changed his story about Camp David, though with very little fanfare).  That needs to play a much greater role than it does in this book in mapping out a strategy for an effective peace lobby that puts the interests of both Israel’s future and Palestinian human rights together on the center stage.

That one flaw notwithstanding, from my perspective as someone who has worked in the field of Israel-Palestine peace for years, and writing from my office in Washington, it is clear that Transforming America’s Israel Lobby is the book we have been waiting for. Those of us “inside the Beltway” have long felt much of what Fleshler says.

And the way he says it is important too. AIPAC is not presented here as a monstrous behemoth, but as an organization with people who share many of the goals that the peace camp does, just with different ideas of how to get there. The alternative he calls for must be built, and what there is of it now must mobilize in support of Barack Obama.

For the first time in decades, a US President is leading a fight against the settlement enterprise. It’s long overdue, and those of us who care about Israel’s future, who care about Palestinians’ human rights, who care about peace need to do everything we can to support him. And, we need also to build for the future. Following Fleshler’s blueprint would be a great way to do it.

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In Morris one can also see the frustrated idealism of the Meretz party, once the conscience of the mainstream left and progressive activists to balance Labor’s mainstream pragmatism.

Morris, like his country, was born in 1948. He was a paratrooper in the army, and in 1969 was wounded during Israel’s war of attrition with Egypt. He worked for twelve years as a reporter for the Jerusalem Post, which was at the time a major left-leaning newspaper in Israel.

The historian again saw action as a reservist in Lebanon in 1982, but refused to serve just six years later in the West Bank, and was jailed for his stance. That same year, he gained national fame with his groundbreaking study, The Birth of the Palestinians Refugee Problem, 1947-1949.

Through the early 90s, Morris was regarded as an ultra-leftist and an icon of Post-Zionism. But as the Oslo years wore on and hopes for peace dimmed from the pinnacle they reached with the Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn in 1993, like so many Israelis , Morris grew more pessimistic and disillusioned.

With the Al-Aksa Intifada’s violence leaving hopes shattered during the early years of this decade, Morris started speaking much more about “Arab mendacity” and the desire of Palestinians and all Arabs to sacrifice everything for the sake of destroying Israel. This was most evident in a 2004 interview in Ha’aretz, where Morris criticized David Ben-Gurion for not expelling all the Arabs from the nascent state of Israel, among other things.

His newest book, One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict illustrates the scope of Benny Morris’ work.

Benny MorrisMorris is an outstanding researcher. He digs down and assembles facts in minute detail. But as a polemicist, and in general as a thinker, he is not particularly adept. When he sticks to the facts, he has shown himself to be remarkably skilled at presenting them in an even-handed and thorough fashion, even when they do not support a view he holds. But when drawing conclusions or taking leaps of deductive reasoning, he tends to fall very short, with enormous, even prejudiced, bias coming through very sharply.

This too is well illustrated in his latest book. One State has three sections. The middle one which, though also flawed, is by far the best, details the history of both one- and two-state ideologies and strategies, from early bi-nationalism through to present-day diplomacy on the Oslo/Annapolis track.  

That history is not encouraging, with one solution after another being obstructed or rejected by one side or the other, sometimes both. But for Morris, the history is really two histories: one of pragmatic acceptance of partition of the land of Palestine/Eretz Yisrael on the part of the Jews, and the other the constant rejection of coexistence by Arabs.

Morris sets the tone in his first chapter, a review of the current rise of one-state thinking, largely among Palestinians and their supporters. He quotes, at some length, from Rashid Khalidi’s very worthy book The Iron Cage, accompanied by a flat statement that, despite Khalidi’s assertion to the contrary, Khalidi supports a single-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Morris offers no evidence for this assertion. He simply states it, based only on Khalidi’s exposition of the one-state position—an exposition that is clearly critical of the stance. And, one might add, an exposition that Morris himself would almost immediately imitate in this same book.

As Morris moves into his history of bi-nationalist ideas, notions of federated states and the various plans to partition Palestine, he works to trace a line from the earliest Palestinian and Arab opposition to Zionism directly and consistently through to today’s Palestinian proposals for full statehood and an end to the conflict. Morris, in his attempt to draw that direct line, makes no attempt to adjust his reading for circumstances. Thus, he sees the absolute rejectionism of Zionism by the Arab world before 1948 in the same light as he does the PLO’s gradual acceptance of a two-state settlement through the 1970s and 80s. For him, it cannot be possible that the Palestinians have come to accept the two-state solution as the only option, despite still believing that this is an unjust solution.

It seems that for Morris, Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution can only be sincere if they recognize the legitimacy of the Zionist movement. That hardly seems a realistic standard. No Palestinian I have ever encountered, including the many who completely acknowledge that Jews have a historic, cultural and religious connection to the land, endorses a two-state solution on that basis. They do so because they recognize it is the only feasible solution.

This shouldn’t be such a leap. Morris himself has documented the fact that the acceptance by the Yishuv leadership, under David Ben-Gurion, of the Peel partition plan of 1937 was a tactic, and that Ben-Gurion never intended to settle for that small patch of land. It was a pragmatic decision. This is true today as well, for a great many Israelis—they don’t want to give up the West Bank, and certainly not any part of Jerusalem, but most remain willing to do so in order to end the conflict.

It is very telling that Morris’ analysis of the decline of the Oslo process makes no mention of the massive expansion of settlements. He pays a great deal of attention to the issue of expunging parts of the PLO charter (the amendments made have never been deemed sufficient by Israel) and the ongoing terrorism in the 90s. But he sees no role in the failure of the peace process for the massive explosion in the number of settlements and settlers in those years or the sharp decline in the Palestinian standard of living. This was due, in part, to the Palestinian Authority’s own corruption. However, the most direct factors were the increasing restrictions placed on Palestinian freedom of movement due to the settlements and their accompanying bypass roads, combined with the elimination of most of the jobs in Israel for Palestinians, as Israelis shifted to employing foreign guest workers from the Philippines, and Thailand, among other places, for menial labor.

Morris offers no alternative to the one-state or two-state solutions. He only suggests the revival of an old idea of subsuming, either by confederation or annexation, a Palestinian entity under Jordanian rule. The notion is far from the table, as it is an option that no one but a few Israelis desire. Beyond that, and not surprisingly, there is no constructive thought here.

In the final chapter, Morris does make some very important points about the problems with a two-state solution. The geography of partition has always been a major issue, one that has generally been understated. From the Peel Commission partition plan in 1937 to the Clinton Parameters in 2000, when one actually looks at the proposals on a map, they certainly don’t look like very practical alternatives. Also, the process of building an independent Palestinian economy is going to take a very long time, and even if successful, that economy is not likely to be on a par with Israel’s. And that will always be the comparison.

There are other problems with a two-state solution, and they’re getting worse every day.  Morris demonstrates one of the biggest: the anger and bigotry that decades of conflict have spawned. One example: “Israeli Jewish society remains largely secular, with Western, democratic values predominating. This can hardly dovetail with the authoritarian and religious values of Palestinian Arab society…”

Morris includes in his division Israel’s Palestinian citizens, pointing out the greater crime rates among Arabs than Jews within Israel’s borders. He conveniently ignores the universally accepted correlation between wealth and social status with crime rates and instead attributes the difference to the distinction between the Jewish culture and the Arab.

There are real reasons on the ground that a two-state solution is a lot more difficult than many people believe it to be. And I certainly agree that any one-state formulation is a non-starter. But Morris demonstrates what might be the greatest obstacle to any resolution: the irrational, bigoted hatred of the other. For him, there is no such thing as a trustworthy Arab.

Too many Israelis and Palestinians, as well as their supporters throughout the world, hold views of this type. Morris typifies the Israeli version. We’ve all heard a great deal about the Palestinian one, in places like the Hamas charter, or the Muslim one that Mahmoud Ahmedinejad displayed again so well in Geneva a few weeks ago. Until that mindset is overcome, hope is, indeed, in very short supply.

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He rambled about Israeli racism (whilst one wonders what a Baha’i observer might have been thinking) and said that the “pretext of Jewish suffering” was used to cover Israeli crimes. Ahmadinejad firmly re-established his bona fides as an anti-Semite and a demagogue, and in so doing seriously undermined the good efforts at Durban II.

The conference organizers really wanted to get past the 2001 conference. But their own short-sightedness doomed them. There was every reason to believe that the Iranian leader’s speech was going to be just what it turned out to be – a full rehash of all the 2001 problems. Yet they welcomed him to the podium anyway. Now they have an even more formidable task of trying to overcome both 2001 and Ahmedinejad’s appearance.

In an interesting coincidence, the European Commission had just chastised some of its own member states for boycotting the conference in anticipation of Ahmedinejad’s appearance. And then most of the rest of the EU states walked out on the speech. Ahmedinejad, as this response demonstrates, dealt a serious blow to those who are advocating engagement with Iran and bolstered the case of those who contend, incorrectly, that the Iranian regime cannot be dealt with rationally.

Iran’s history, even under the Islamic Revolutionary regime, has been one of a rational actor pursuing, in many cases with criminal and objectionable means, rational goals of enhancing its own position and power. They can be dealt with. But Ahmedinejad, who is not the head of the Iranian state, has repeatedly shown himself to be an unreasonable figure. In these tense times, with Israel rattling its military sabers, this is a very stupid move.

Once again, the foolish singling out of Israel has undermined the Durban process. This time, it was due to a really stupid decision on the part of the UN conference’s organizers, and despite the fact that this one decision stood in marked contrast to the vast efforts made to avoid just this outcome.

But not be outdone, Israel recalled its ambassador from Switzerland because their prime minister met with Ahmedinejad before his appearance at the conference. The Netanyahu government wanted, apparently, to make sure that Ahmedinejad didn’t corner the market on looking foolish. The Swiss have a long tradition of staying out of others’ disputes and trying to engage and mediate.

Israel knows that very well. Surely they cannot reasonably expect the Swiss government to snub a visiting head of state they are not in conflict with, however objectionable that head of state may be. That’s simply unrealistic. It’s just another move by Bibi to win populist points at home and never mind the expense to Israel’s image in the rest world.

Originally posted at Realistic Peace

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Of course it did. No armed conflict in history has been fought without war crimes being committed, by all parties. War is an ugly business, not given to being run by a rulebook. And these days, with conflicts increasingly being characterized by poorly armed militias battling regular armies in populated urban areas, it’s getting a lot uglier.

But that’s the wrong question. The right one is that raised by the testimony given by those Israel Defense Forces soldiers: were the breaches of both international law and Israeli military regulations and norms the result of individual soldiers going beyond their bounds, or were they due to an atmosphere created by, or because of directives handed down from the middle and upper echelons of the Israeli military?

This question is not likely to be answered any time soon. Israel is contenting itself with pronouncements that it has “the most moral army in the world” rather than responsibly examining whether that still holds true. Meanwhile, pundits are eagerly savaging the officer who runs the Yitzhak Rabin pre-military preparatory course at Oranim Academic College in Tivon, Danny Zamir.

Far from being the “notorious ultra-leftist” he is being painted as, Major Zamir is a 20-year veteran of the IDF, a deputy commander of an elite reserve battalion, and his academy, which he’s run for over a decade, has trained many IDF officers. He did serve a month’s detention in 1990 for refusing to guard a settler procession, so he obviously has some tendencies in anti-settlement directions. But to paint this man as anything other than a dedicated soldier is simply absurd and counter-factual.

The Need For Credibility

Of course, Israel stated that it intended to investigate the allegations raised at Oranim. The problem is the nature of the investigation and the identity of the investigators.

The inquiry was carried out by the IDF. This is problematic; it should be obvious that one cannot legitimately investigate oneself. Even if the investigation was indeed sincere and thorough, it still won’t be seen as unbiased. Only an external investigation can provide that credibility. The IDF can and should be involved in the investigation, but it must be led by credible civilian experts.

The public, both in Israel and around the world, needs to know whether the Israeli armed forces as a whole took proper care to avoid killing or injuring civilians, and to minimize damage to both civilian people and property.

Serious Allegations, Insufficient Responses

The discrepancies between the numbers of civilian casualties reported by Palestinian human rights groups in Gaza and those calculated by the IDF are to be expected. But they also reflect differing views of who is a civilian. For instance, some 250 Palestinian police were killed. Israel considers them combatants; Palestinians and human rights groups do not. Under international law, civil police are not legitimate targets, but Israel says they were also part of Hamas’ militia. If it’s true that the police were engaged in military activities, they lose their protection as civilians. But evidence to support this claim has not yet been presented.

The points Israel has raised in its defense aren’t convincing. They repeatedly say that they dropped leaflets, and even placed phone calls directly warning civilians to abandon certain areas. The trouble is that, in Gaza, there was nowhere to go. The absolute seal on the borders of Gaza, a densely populated but small area, left people nowhere to flee, a fact Israel must have been aware of. That makes the steps the Israel Defense Forces took look more like cover for Israel than an expression of genuine concern for Palestinian civilians.

The issue of white phosphorous illustrates the problem. Human Rights Watch issued a stunning report on Israel’s use of phosphorous. In contrast to the recent report by Amnesty International, which was long on rhetoric and disturbingly short on evidence, HRW’s report makes a strong case that Israel used phosphorous weapons improperly. Israel insists it used the weapon “in accordance with international law.” But, since this weapon is only permissible in open areas when used to illuminate a battlefield, and expressly forbidden in populated civilian areas, Israel’s statement is factually impossible.

More likely, Israel’s meaning is that it was not trying to use white phosphorous as an incendiary weapon to harm people, but rather for its intended purpose of illumination. That the terrain forbade the use for this purpose is likely seen by Israel as the inevitable consequence of fighting Hamas while they took shelter in civilian areas.

This question illustrates the key points we must get at in Gaza: Did Israel take the proper care to avoid harm to civilians as defined, not by Israel, but by international humanitarian law? And to what extent did Hamas’ use of civilians and civilian infrastructure compromise Israel’s ability to comply with the law? Both these questions must be answered credibly, and one cannot be answered unless the other is given equal weight.

An Atmosphere That Leads to War Crimes

Asa Kasher, a professor at Tel Aviv University, drafted the IDF ethical code of conduct. Recently, in Ha’aretz, Kasher said “If it’s between the soldier and the terrorist’s neighbor, the priority is the soldier.”

Many may agree with that concept. But it flies in the face of the laws of war, and the international norms that Israel has repeatedly vowed to uphold. The testimony of the Gaza veterans indicates that the lives of soldiers were prioritized well ahead of sparing civilians as much as possible.

Mere days after the beginning of Operation Cast Lead, Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Dan Harel made it clear that Israel was not limiting itself to military targets, but was targeting the civilian infrastructure of Gaza, as it was part of the Hamas government. The fact is that Hamas controls the systems that civilians need for day to day life, and those parts that are not military in nature cannot be targeted.

Therein lies the rub, and the need for a full and impartial investigation. Israel doesn’t deny that it hit many civilian targets in the war. Israel has claimed that Hamas made extensive use of civilians and civilian sites for military purposes, and there is significant evidence to support this claim. When an army deliberately targets a civilian site, the burden of proof is on it to demonstrate that the site was, in fact, being used for military purposes, or the army at least had very good reason to believe so. Israel has offered no such proof beyond its good word.

Israel Itself Needs A Credible Investigation

In 2002, Israel was accused of killing hundreds, even thousands of civilians in the Jenin refugee camp. Impartial investigations, acknowledged as such by Israel and carried out by the UN, showed the total number of Palestinians killed was 52, of which perhaps half were civilians. The report did not, by any stretch, exonerate Israel. It spoke of serious crimes and violations, but these were far less than what Israel had been accused of. In 2009, something similar is the most likely outcome of a sincere investigation. It is in Israel’s interest to pursue this.

Israel’s current responses to accusations of war crimes in Gaza are convincing no one outside of those who dismissed the allegations out of hand in the first place. This is to be expected when the investigations are conducted, in essence, by the accused and the results exonerate Israel completely. Many, this writer included, would very much like to see Israel exonerated of as many accusations as it can be. But this can only happen if the truth can be established by a credible body, and if we are all prepared to deal with whatever that truth may turn out to be.

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Harris is not alone in his reaction to Cohen. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency’s editor’s blog, The Telegraph, was merciless in its critique of Cohen. The Jewish Journal took serious exception to Cohen’s piece on Iran. And one hardly needs to look to guess what CAMERA (the Orwellian-named ‘Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America’) has to say.

Sometimes it’s explicit. And sometimes it lies just under the surface. But the idea that Cohen’s views are based on an inherent bias against Israel is present in all of these responses. This is not unusual, and it’s not unique to proponents of Israeli government policy either. Supporters of the Palestinians also tend to assume that anyone defending Israel can only do so if they are hopelessly biased in favor of it.

It seems as though it’s impossible to have an honest opinion on the matter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We can only be seen to hold those beliefs that our predilections force upon us. This is the way it is with most charged political debates, of course, but it is most acute when the subject includes Israel.

What is it about Roger Cohen’s work that has provoked such a profound response? Is it that yet another prominent Diaspora Jew has chosen to upbraid the Israeli government? Is it that the journalist’s employer is changing its historic position on Israel? None of the above. Cohen is simply painting a more complex and nuanced picture of the Middle East. And he’s raising hackles because he is also criticizing Israel’s policies. Both the case he makes, and the reaction it has provoked, are therefore instructive.

Roger Cohen is apparently not being stifled. This is a sign of the times, and Israel’s increasingly degraded global image. But, rather than address Cohen’s salient points, David Harris’ rejoinder focuses entirely on the evils of Hamas, and pays scant attention to the enormous suffering the war inflicted on the civilian population of Gaza by the Israel Defense Forces. Cohen rightly fires back with illustration of that suffering.

Like any war, Operation Cast Lead must be examined critically, and that examination must cast a critical eye at the conduct of both sides. But the end result of that war was…what, exactly? If Israel won, what gains did it realize? Rocket fire from Gaza continues. Hamas’ military capabilities certainly suffered a blow, but they are rebuilding, and that same blow also seriously compromised Hamas’ ability to control other armed groups in Gaza. Those groups, according to Israeli intelligence, are the ones firing the rockets.

Israel lost, at least temporarily, diplomatic ties with one of only three Arab countries with which it had enjoyed them. Its relationship with Turkey, its sole military ally in the Muslim world, was severely strained; and the war dramatically raised local popular hostility toward the government of Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, both of whom were seen as supporting Israel. Most of the world is absolutely convinced that Israel committed horrible war crimes in Gaza, and Israel’s adamant refusal to allow human rights investigators into Gaza reinforces that perception. Even in the United States, sympathy for Israel is at an all-time low.

Hamas, in turn, has survived and has deepened its control over Gaza. The Islamist organization’s popularity is higher than it’s ever been among Palestinians and the ‘Arab street’. The Arab League nations, who once varied only by degree in their opposition to Hamas, are increasingly split over whether to relate to them as a legitimate leadership body now. In Europe, Hamas are increasingly being talked of as a governmental entity. Fatah, Israel’s ally in the Palestinian Authority, is negotiating the formation of a unity government with Hamas. And, Gilad Shalit, the symbol of Israel’s impotence during the Olmert years, remains in captivity.

This is Israel’s payoff for the Gaza war. And the price? Over 1,300 persons dead. How many of them were actually civilians is yet another detail about which we only have the conflicting claims of Hamas and Israel. But even Israeli estimates put it at over 400, a number that warrants an official inquiry. An IDF investigation concluded that the number of homes destroyed or damaged in the operation was so great that it would be “very difficult” for Israel to legally justify this destructiveness. The electricity and water supply is still disrupted, even compared to the poor levels of service that held in Gaza before the war. And much of the damage cannot be repaired because Israel continues to refuse to allow many building materials and spare machinery parts (including many for medical equipment) into Gaza.

13 Israelis were killed during the Gaza campaign, four being felled by “friendly fire.” The southern towns of Sderot, Ashkelon, Ashdod and Beersheva, as well as nearby towns and kibbutzim were subjected to weeks of terror. It is about all of this, the destruction on both sides, that Roger Cohen is asking “For what?”

Harris’ glib reply is to ask Cohen what he would have had Israel do. The journalist has some answers, but even if there were none, if this was Israel’s only option for action, doing nothing would have been far preferable.

Israel has every right, indeed, the most compelling and binding moral obligation, to defend and protect its citizens. But, as Cohen correctly puts it, Hamas’ murderous and blatant crimes do not give Israel the right “…to blow Gaza to pieces, or deprive people of food, water, and medicine. “ In the end, as has been true with most tactics on both sides, it was the civilian population that suffered the most, while the leadership, Hamas, survived.

These are serious issues, and ones for which Israel has already been presumed guilty by most of the world. Its refusal to allow investigators into Gaza or launch a credible independent investigation of its own (i.e. one that is not run by the military, an obvious conflict of interest) provides substantial evidence for those who are presuming Israel’s guilt, and undermines Israel’s democratic principles. Therefore it is left to the press, or, to be precise, to the Roger Cohens of the world to fill in these gaps in a clear and sober manner.

When Cohen expresses his shame over these events, he is expressing his connection with and anxiety about Israel, as an American Jew. The New York Times journalist’s recommendations are geared toward resolution and sound tactics (at least as he sees it), and show an abiding concern for Israel’s moral fiber and democratic principles that his critics, for all their bombast, sadly lack. Criticizing Cohen by saying that ‘Hamas is a terrorist group’ is simply not sufficient. Such impoverished responses ironically underline the fact that there is no legitimate means of defending the situation Cohen decries.

As we’ve painfully learned in the US over the past seven years, one way that terrorists ultimately win is by making their enemies abandon their principles in the name of security. This is the conformist moral logic appealed to by individuals like David Harris, who find themselves increasingly trapped by their outdated concept of what it means to ‘love’ Israel. What this love means is always more of the same:  maintaining an unacceptable status quo that degrades Jewish values and Israeli nationhood. It is Roger Cohen, and those like him, who are trying to rescue Israel, and the rest of us, from this tragic fate.

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"The US is not going to join the world in seeking to implement a diplomatic settlement," Chomsky told his Iranian interlocutor. "and if that is the case, (George) Mitchell’s mission is vacuous."

In theory, one can debate all sorts of things. However, the proof is in the actions oft he new president. Already we are seeing signs that Chomsky’s pessimism is misplaced. In fact, early indications show a distinct change in American policy, with the possibility of more to come.

Durban 2

One small examplewas Obama’s reversal of the Bush administration’sdecision to boycott the planning of the so-called Durban2 conference. This gathering, which will be held in Geneva in April, is a follow up to the much criticized first World Conference Against Racism that took place in 2001 in Durban, SouthAfrica.

That conference was largely diverted by pro-Palestinian groups and governments pushing anextremist agenda. The US and Israel both walked out. Some of those same NGOs and governmental delegations are pushing a similar agenda this time. But there are also strong forces working to ensure that this WCAR addresses broader issues of racism, and avoids the descenti nto anti-Semitism that characterized the first conference.

Israel has already announced its boycott, as has Canada. The United States has now decided, however, that the best way to prevent the conference from descending into an anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic frenzy is to engage in the event’s planning. If that fails, the Americans can always decide not to participate, as the U.S. and Israeli delegations did in 2001.

Barack Obama should be applauded for taking this course of action. He is working to prevent another demonstration of anti-Jewish racism, while demonstrating that failed strategies for combating it are being abandoned. Sadly, the Israeli government, and a number of prominent U.S. Jewish leaders would rather continue to use claims of anti-Semitism as a political hammer than try to eradicate the phenomenon.

The Settlements

The Durban 2 decision is nothing in comparison to the stance that is emerging regarding settlement expansion in the West Bank. Ha’aretz reported on February 15 that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Special Mideast Envoy George Mitchell are expected to take a firm stance with Israel on settlement expansion, including threatening to reduce the remaining $1.3 billion in loan guarantees the US has promised to Israel by the amount spent on settlement expansion.

This expectation was bolstered by statements in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. On February 12, opening a hearing on the Gaza War, the chairman of the subcommittee, Gary Ackerman, one of the House’s key pro-Israel leaders, issued a scathing indictment of Israel’s settlement enterprise. Coming from a source like Ackerman, blame for the stalled peace process being laid at the doorstep of settlements alongside (though not, Ackerman was quick to point out, on an equal footing with) Palestinian violence was surprising, to say the least.

Ackerman’s bold statement indicates that the direction Obama intends to head in is being mapped out not only with his own team of advisors, but with key pro-Israel figures in Congress. Unlike Jimmy Carter or George H.W. Bush, whose maverick policy making endeavors eschewed such collaboration, Obama is crafting an approach that he hopes will be executed without opposition from legislators and AIPAC-allied forces.

Indeed, at that very hearing (which I attended) we saw how things may split amongst Israel’s supporters in Congress. While Shelly Berkley and ranking Republican Dan Burton sang the same old tune, other notable figures like Robert Wexler appeared very much in line with Ackerman, as did some of the House’s newer lawmakers, such asrepresentatives Gerald Connolly and Michael McMahon. This indicates that the Obama team has marshaled reasonable Democrats behind it, and is ready to brave the attacks of the old guard.

Border Crossings

It is no coincidence that Israel has suddenly shown a willingness to discuss ways to openGaza’s border crossings as part of a long-term truce and reconstruction arrangement. The idea was never hinted at during the Bush administration’s tenure, right through its very last day. Suddenly, under Obama, it has become a cornerstone of every proposed arrangement.

In my discussions with officials at the State Department, it has been very clear that, while they always felt this was a necessary condition, Israel’s responsiveness to the idea changed dramatically once they knew the President agreed with that direction.

Obama’s team has demonstrated its interest in building stability in Gaza. It has also been absolutely clear (as was Ackerman) that anything that legitimized Hamas was a red line it was not willing to cross. But  instead of leaving the people of Gaza to starve, they have insisted on exploring alternatives that would allow the territory’s civilian population to pursue their businesses and access needed services while bypassing its Islamist government

This strategy might well fail. The hope is to find a way to re-establish the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Hamas is both determined and well-positioned enough to prevent that. The Obama administration will not legitimize Hamas, and sees that as too high a price to pay to open up access to the devastated territory.

Hamas stands accused of very serious breaches of Gazans’ trust. It appears to have wantonly deployed its forces in civilian areas during the fighting with Israel (to a greater degree than the considerable extent that the physical terrain and crowded conditions of Gaza made inevitable), and it has carried out beatings and executions of political enemies during and after the war. Hamas’ well-documented attempts to steal aid from UNRWA nearly cut off the one lifeline for humanitarian assistance that the people of Gaza have left.

Hamas’ position is not strong, and recent polls indicate that, while its profile remains high in the Arab world at large, in Gaza, support is at a low point. There may indeed be a way to administer the crossings without benefiting the Palestinian organization.

However, even if there is not, the fact that the US has chosen to vigorously pursue this approach is further evidence of real change from the Obama administration. Its stated eagerness to open a dialogue with Syria, and its slow pace in appointing an envoy to Iran further underline the depth of this change.

The Blank Cheque Has Bounced

Despite this change in policy direction, it is important to recognize that Israel isstill the American government’s most valued ally in the Middle East. It is seen by the Obama administration as the closest friend the US has in the region, and it will remain that way on the President’s final day in office.

What has taken hold in Washington is the clarity that only a party outside of a conflict can have. It is the view of what is truly in the best interest of both Israel and America. It is an understanding that giving Israel a blank cheque to decide its own course is unwise, especially when that course is subject to the volatile emotions of a populace in long-term conflict and a political system that is fractured and broken.

Martin Indyk, former US ambassador to Israel and founder ofthe pro-Israel think tank the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, stated after Obama’s electoral victory that the "era of the blank cheque is over." This change is not due to decreased sympathy for Israel. On the contrary, it is precisely because of such sentiments, combined with a sober analysis of Israeli needs, that the Obama administration is embarking on this course. And it’s also why it may very well succeed.

The rightward shift in Israel is a major obstacle. But Israel — even Benjamin Netanyahu– has already demonstrated that it understands that this is a new America it’s dealing with. The question of how effective this strategy will be will come down to how well the Obama administration can deal with the backlash from so-called "pro-Israel" forces, who do not understand how much harm they are doing to the Jewish state, with their focus on protecting the settlements and defending other Israeli policy excesses.

Part of that equation will be measured by Obama’s willingness to stay the course. But part will also come from the efforts of pro-Israel, pro-peace groups whose task it will be to counter two opposing forces. One is the supporters of the status quo, such as AIPAC, and more radical US organizations, such as the Zionist Organization of America. The other is the radical left who will follow Chomsky’s lead and insist that until the US adopts an unrealistic and ineffective posture of withdrawing its support (particularly military aid) for Israel, nothing will change.

Moderate US peace organizations must demonstrate that a clear American stance that supports Israel’s ability to defend itself, insists on an end to the settlement enterprise, and that gives Palestinians a real chance to build their society is a politically viable and effective position. Though liberal activists and pundits alike have been making this point for years, this is the first time since the beginning of the Oslo era where there has been such a serious chance to actually follow through. If they are effective, Obama’s diplomacy stands a serious chance of succeeding.

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