Yes, But We’re Also Biding Our Time

Talking of querulous conservatives against the surge, here's a bucket of cold water on hot promise in Shiaville:

"There's absolutely no reason to believe that these groups have changed their tune in any significant way" since the 2004 battles, said a U.S. official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity. "You could make an argument that there's just a level of exhaustion that's set in, but I find that not believable."

A more likely scenario is that the militia leaders believe they can "win the whole thing" if they are not too damaged by the time the United States withdraws, the official said …

Maliki is aware of concerns that the militias may be biding their time rather than sincerely taking peaceful steps, his aide said. "This is a classic insurgency tactic, to hide when the troops are around and then reappear when the troops are gone," the aide said. "This is very much understood by the government and by the prime minister, and measures are being taken to make it a failure."

Only a fool would credit Muqtada al-Sadr with good intentions, however, left out of this skeptical assessment of the Mahdi scale-down is any mention of a) just how long those U.S. troops plan to stay in Baghdad, and b) how long a schismatic militia is willing to wait it out before their capital has been severely depleted.

Again, the psychological concomitants of the surge are not to be underestimated. The whole point of counterinsurgency campaigns — correctly termed "war at the graduate level" — is to stay violence not indefinitely but just long enough to win the loyalty of the people. Sadr has yet to experience what a diminished political role feels like, and it's only natural of him to be arrogant enough to think it's our side alone that's operating on borrowed time. But if Iraqis begin to see major improvements in municipal services and employment opportunities courtesy of the coalition, then it will be to Sadr that the question of "what have you done for us lately?" is directed. It doesn't take a Marxist to realize that materialism trumps ideology except for the most fanatical adherents to a cause. Just because it looks like a Shia messianic doesn't mean it necessarily is one: many of the current followers of the Mahdi Army are just as likely to be cowed and fearful nonpartisans — afraid of betraying the guys with guns — whose allegiances are fungible.

Let's conduct a little thought experiment divorced from the fractiousness over what to do in Iraq. Imagine, if you will, a muscular UN troop deployment to Beirut. Instead of acting their characteristic role of "peacekeeping" cardboard cut-outs, the blue helmets actually intervene in the incipient civil war in that Mideastern capital. They stop Hezbollah bandits from establishing road blocks and riding around city streets with AK-47s, intimidating not only political opponents but also ostensible supporters. Violence goes down. Siniora government officials leave their bunker-like buildings and appear before their constituents in broad daylight. If this state of affairs were prolonged long enough, and if Hezbollah's propagandistic alms programs (its hospital and ambulance services, its contracting and engineering teams, etc.) were replaced by legitimate UN counterparts, what would become of Nasrallah's influence? If his hold on power is sustained by hordes of unwavering faithful, then why has his popularity never been greater than after Israel's humiliating defeat last summer?

There's a kind of negative idealism — you might even call it hubris — in the certainty that Baghdad is already lost. Let's by all means entertain the worst-case-scenarios and likely forms of blowback from the surge. But let's also keep in mind the pragmatic military-political strategy, developed by minds more sophisticated than the president's, that lies behind it.