Iraq: Mission Accomplished, After All

Bartle Bull has a remarkable essay in this month's Prospect (the UK cousin to the American liberal magazine). He argues that Iraq is well on its way toward political reconciliation — indeed, most of the "fighting" now taking place does so in salon bull sessions and cabinet meetings — and that the military conflict is dwindling to a containable level. 

As difficult as it has been, especially given the follies of the current administration, to take the long view on Iraq, even veteran war critics have grudgingly conceded the unexpected good news of late: from the Anbar Awakening to the precipitous drop in civilian casualties in the last few months, to the almost superhuman stoicism of the Kurds, who at any time could declare their own independent state but choose instead to abide by the federalist model enshrined in Iraq's constitution. A "civil war" is not attended by a stalled but still legitimate national government going about its business.

Bull's most insightful comment, I think, is that the Sunni insurgency has realized it cannot possibly win in battle against 85% of the population (more, if you count those Sunnis completely disillusioned by their IED-wielding co-sectarians.)  Instead, the insurgency has focussed its efforts on winning the headlines in the New York Times, in which it now competes for our despondency against the murder-by-numbers mercenaries of Blackwater USA. 

The world held its breath after Samarra: here, we thought, comes the cataclysm, the civil war that many had feared and that others had sought for three years. But it never happened. The Shia backlash in parts of Baghdad was vicious, and the Sunnis were more or less kicked out of much of the city. But over 18 months later, it is clear that the Shias were too sensible to go all the way. It was never a civil war: no battle lines or uniforms, no secession, no attempt to seize power or impose constitutional change, no parallel governments, not even any public leaders or aims. The Sunnis rolled the dice, launched the battle of Baghdad and lost. Now they are begging for an accommodation with Shia Iraq. What is the evidence for this? This summer, Maliki's office reached out to Baathist ex-soldiers and officers and received 48,600 requests for jobs in uniform; he made room for 5,000 of them, found civil service jobs for another 7,000, and put the rest of them on a full pension. Meanwhile leading Baathists have told Time magazine they want to be in the government; the 1920 Revolution Brigade—a Sunni insurgent group—is reportedly patrolling the streets of Diyala with the 3rd infantry division, and the Sunni Islamic Army in Iraq is telling al Jazeera it may negotiate with the Americans. The anecdotes coming out of Baghdad confirm the trend. The drawing rooms of the capital's dealmakers are full of Baathists, cap in hand. They are terrified of the Shia death squads and want to share in the pie when the oil starts flowing. Both Izzat al-Douri, the more prestigious of the two main Baathist leaders, and Mohamed Younis al Ahmed, the more lethal, have been reaching out from neighbouring countries to negotiate an accommodation. Since the summer, the news coming out on the Sunni front has consistently been in this one, inevitable direction.

If you think any of this is shocking, by the way, you should check out the reader discussion of the piece in First Drafts, Prospect's blog. Compare the cool-headed sophistication — even in disagreement with the author — against the upset tummies that daily disgorge themselves in the Guardian's comment threads.