The New York Times' editors reply to Gen. Petraeus's report:
The headline out of General Petraeus’s testimony was a prediction that the United States should be able to reduce its forces from 160,000 to 130,000 by next summer. That sounds like a big number, but it would only bring American troops to the level that were in Iraq when Mr. Bush announced his “surge” last January. And it’s the rough equivalent of dropping an object and taking credit for gravity.
Oh, please. The surge was always defined as a temporary escalation of military forces — allied with a completely new strategy for waging counterinsurgency operations — to bring the violence in Iraq to a more manageable level; i.e., to quell the civil war that's been raging since the Golden Mosque bombing. Announcing that, with some measurable improvements in on-the-ground conditions, the U.S. is now ready to withdraw some of those military forces is by no means a shambolic trophy claim of the surge, as the editors sneeringly describe it. It's what the surge was about all along. More NYT bilge:
The main success General Petraeus cited was in the previously all-but-lost Anbar Province where local sheiks, having decided that they hate Al Qaeda more than they hate the United States, have joined forces with American troops to combat insurgents. That development — which may be ephemeral — was not a goal of the surge and surprised American officials. To claim it as a success of the troop buildup is, to be generous, disingenuous.
In this language, a positive unintended consequence of the surge is to be downplayed because it's good news the war strategists failed to anticipate! No accounting in here for the fact that the dramatic about-face in Anbar happened after the infusion an entire Military Regiment into the region.
And actually, it's disingenuous to suggest that turning popular opinion against Al Qaeda was never part of the plan. Here is Gen. Petraeus in his Counterinsurgency Manual, explaining why it is typically so difficult for a country like the U.S. to earn the good faith of an occupied citizenry:
Americans start with an automatic disadvantage because of their reputation for accomplishment, what some call the “man on the moon syndrome.” This refers to the expressed disbelief that a nation that can put a man on the moon cannot quickly restore basic services. U.S. agencies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts should also avoid making exorbitant promises. In some cultures, failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, not good intentions gone awry. In other cultures, exorbitant promises are the norm, and people do not expect them to be kept. So counterinsurgents must understand these local norms and employ locally tailored approaches to ensure expectations are controlled. Managing expectations also involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN. In the final judgment, victory comes by convincing the people that their life will be better under the government than under the insurgent. [Italics added.]
One could argue that the Marines had absolutely nothing to do with the sheiks' newfound loathing of Al Qaeda, which is its own advertisement in misery and subjugation. (Though, again, the timing of their about-face is curious.) However, if the one force those sheiks are willing to turn to in getting rid of the jihadist nasties is the government-backed Marines, then clearly, life under the government has proven, at least for the short term, to be better than life under the insurgent.
What fun activity relating to female firefighters can I make my class do?